Since the terrible accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant one year ago, people here are very sensitive as to their food and drink in case they might contain radioactive element beyond a certain level, and for a good reason. Some journalists, scientists, and even medical doctors have made them all the more anxious by stating that we should aim at taking zero-radioactive food, without telling them if it is possible at all, or, if the amount of intake could be looked at in a wider perspective.
Therefore, the publication in a book form, in March 2012, of the record of a three-and-a-half hour discussion by several professionals on this subject, or more precisely, on the 'truth about the internal nuclear exposure', to use the sub-title of the book, in easy Japanese, is a matter of congratulations. It was published by Nagasaki University which has done a lot of research work on the radioactive fallout both in Japan and at Chernobyl.
Unlike the case of Chernobyl, where most of the exposure came from the internal sources, i.e., from the food-intake over the long years since the explosion(25 years on 26 April 2011), in the case of Fukushima the danger comes mainly from the external, i.e.,from the fallout carried by the wind. Then how is it that the people are afraid of their food and drink?
Broadly the reasons are two. One is that some intellectuals who are supposed to be specialists in the fields have loudly talked about the danger of locally-produced food. Moreover, by so doing, they tend to give the impression that they really know. The media would go to them, rather than to the scholars of more balanced view. Interestingly, those scientists with such an extreme view are mostly physicists(presumably because they believe in the continuous existence of the matter). We are also led to wonder why the physicists and others have not talked to each other.
Another reason is concerned with what I have called the more balanced view. The participants in the discussion seem to be of the opinion that the Japanese are not good at taking such a view. They tend to think in terms of either right or wrong. The participants of course agree that the less the intake of radioactivity-affected food or drink the better. But it is not possible to reduce it to zero. There is some radioactivity inside our bodies and in the atmosphere around us to begin with. Therefore it should be put not in the zero or plus formula but in the cost-benefit or risk-benefit way. Some food items may be contaminated to a certain extent. Should we refuse to take them then? If so what would be the alternative sources of food, and is the alternative available all the time?
A similar inexperience in risk management was seen at the earliest stage of the accident when there was a considerable delay in opening the vent of the reactors. If the vent had been opened at the earliest opportunity, the hydrogen explosion would have been averted, and the fallout would have been much less. The delay should be explained in terms of the stereotyped notion that it should not be opened as it would result in the fallout. However, the risk of the fallout from opening the vent and the risk accompanying the explosion should have been put in perspective, in trade-off relations. The fact is they were not.
Incidentally it was pointed out that the Fukushima reactors belonged to the BWR/Mark 1 type designed by the GE. Later on the GE noticed that this type had a defect in that it would be in danger of explosion when all the sources of electricity were cut off-exactly what happened this time. It was probably then that they fixed a vent.
They also reported this before the Congressional hearing, and informed the users as well. Have the Japanese users taken note of the seriousness of the matter? And where has the know-how been stocked till now? Neither the government or the company has spoken a word on it.
Therefore, the publication in a book form, in March 2012, of the record of a three-and-a-half hour discussion by several professionals on this subject, or more precisely, on the 'truth about the internal nuclear exposure', to use the sub-title of the book, in easy Japanese, is a matter of congratulations. It was published by Nagasaki University which has done a lot of research work on the radioactive fallout both in Japan and at Chernobyl.
Unlike the case of Chernobyl, where most of the exposure came from the internal sources, i.e., from the food-intake over the long years since the explosion(25 years on 26 April 2011), in the case of Fukushima the danger comes mainly from the external, i.e.,from the fallout carried by the wind. Then how is it that the people are afraid of their food and drink?
Broadly the reasons are two. One is that some intellectuals who are supposed to be specialists in the fields have loudly talked about the danger of locally-produced food. Moreover, by so doing, they tend to give the impression that they really know. The media would go to them, rather than to the scholars of more balanced view. Interestingly, those scientists with such an extreme view are mostly physicists(presumably because they believe in the continuous existence of the matter). We are also led to wonder why the physicists and others have not talked to each other.
Another reason is concerned with what I have called the more balanced view. The participants in the discussion seem to be of the opinion that the Japanese are not good at taking such a view. They tend to think in terms of either right or wrong. The participants of course agree that the less the intake of radioactivity-affected food or drink the better. But it is not possible to reduce it to zero. There is some radioactivity inside our bodies and in the atmosphere around us to begin with. Therefore it should be put not in the zero or plus formula but in the cost-benefit or risk-benefit way. Some food items may be contaminated to a certain extent. Should we refuse to take them then? If so what would be the alternative sources of food, and is the alternative available all the time?
A similar inexperience in risk management was seen at the earliest stage of the accident when there was a considerable delay in opening the vent of the reactors. If the vent had been opened at the earliest opportunity, the hydrogen explosion would have been averted, and the fallout would have been much less. The delay should be explained in terms of the stereotyped notion that it should not be opened as it would result in the fallout. However, the risk of the fallout from opening the vent and the risk accompanying the explosion should have been put in perspective, in trade-off relations. The fact is they were not.
Incidentally it was pointed out that the Fukushima reactors belonged to the BWR/Mark 1 type designed by the GE. Later on the GE noticed that this type had a defect in that it would be in danger of explosion when all the sources of electricity were cut off-exactly what happened this time. It was probably then that they fixed a vent.
They also reported this before the Congressional hearing, and informed the users as well. Have the Japanese users taken note of the seriousness of the matter? And where has the know-how been stocked till now? Neither the government or the company has spoken a word on it.
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